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1  Introduction 
Antitrust  authorities  are  showing  increasing  interest  in  the  analysis  of 
interconnection agreements used by Internet Operators to exchange traffic 
packets.  They  focus  on  these  arrangements  to  detect  both  actual  and 
potential abuse of a position of significant market power1. In this setting, a 
dominant  position  may  lead  to  the  establishment  of  “unfair”  conditions 
associated to the bilateral exchanges of traffic.  
A  growing  literature  is  focussing  on  the  issue  of  interconnection 
agreements  between  providers  in  the  Internet  Industry  (Foros,  Kind,  and 
Sørgard 2002; Crémer et al. 2000; Foros and Hansen, 2001; Economides 1998, 
to name just a few). The actual interconnection regime between a pair of 
providers is clearly the result of a strategic game. In particular, the Internet 
operators are in a relationship of both complementarity (each network must 
be  able  to  access  each  other  in  order  to  assure  the  Internet  universal 
connectivity)  and  competitiveness  (they  compete  over  downstream 
customers).  
Broadly speaking, each pair of providers can be interconnected in two 
different  ways:  they  can  exchange  their  traffic  through  a  direct  link  (this 
agreement  is  known  as  “peering”);  otherwise,  they  will  use  upstream 
intermediaries,  called  “transit  providers”.  These  two  alternative  ways  to 
exchange traffic clearly affect the quality of the interconnection between the 
two  providers2:  peering  assures  a  better  quality  than  transit  agreements, 
given  its  “dedicated”  character3.  Even  within  the  category  of  peering, 
however, providers are able to “modulate” the relative quality of the link. 
                                                 
1 See for example the 1998 MCI WorldCom and the 2000 MCI-Worldcom Sprint mergers enquiries  by 
the European Commission .  Official Journal Of the European Commission (2000), Regulation (EEC) N 
4046/89, Merger Procedure, Bruxelles, European Commission, DGXIII. See also Buccirossi et al. (2005). 
2 The quality of interconnection can be measured by different parameters such as packet loss, latency, 
band-width. 
3 In particular, the quality of a direct peering link is generally better than the one of an indirect transit 





Theoretical  research  is  trying  to  model  the  Internet  providers’ 
interconnections decisions, mainly by using a game theoretical approach4. 
The central question  addressed is “does a  provider have the incentive to 
degrade  the quality of its interconnection with some other providers?”. This 
question becomes interesting if we consider asymmetric networks.  Indeed, 
having the bigger provider a larger customer base than the smaller one, the 
degradation of the interconnection quality is more harmful for the latter, due 
to the  asymmetric  losses  in  good  quality  connectivity  (the  large  provider 
loses good connectivity to less final users than the smaller provider does).   
This research is particularly important from an antitrust point of view, since 
degrading interconnection towards smaller providers can lead to increasing 
market power, due to a “market tipping” process, which can then induce a 
monopolistic type of restriction in Internet supply. This preoccupation about 
incentives  towards  quality  discrimination,  leading  to  market  tipping,  was 
indeed the main argument in the European Commission decision to block 
the  proposed    merger  between  MCI-Worldcom  and  Sprint  in  20005. 
Moreover,  understanding  the  real  extent  of  this  problem  is  particularly 
relevant   within the “Net Neutrality” debate about the potential need for 
introducing interconnection regulation in the Internet6. 
The  game  theoretical  models,  referred  above,  provided  contrasting 
answers to the question at hand, motivating the need for more empirical 
research.  This  is,  in  fact,  still  scarce,  and  mainly  anecdotic,  essentially 
because  of  the  confidentiality  that  characterizes  the  providers’ 
interconnection agreements and Internet traffic data. Our work provides a 
contribution in this direction: this is possible thanks to a novel approach to 
                                                 
4  See  for  example  Crémer  et  al.  (2000);  Economides  (2005);  Foros  and  Hansen  (2001);  Baake  and 
Wichmann (1999); Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003); Mah (2005); Weiss and Shin (2004); Jahn and 
Prüfer (2004), Ida (2005). 
5 See footnote 1. 
6 For a summary of the increasing  body of literature on the   Net Neutrality  see  Sidak (2006).   
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obtain  data,  which  follows  recent  advances  in  the  fields  of  Theoretical 
Computer Science7. 
We investigate if asymmetry between a pair of providers is associated 
to interconnection quality degradation. In particular, the presence of direct 
peering, involving a dedicated agreement between the two providers, will 
be considered as a “high quality interconnection”. In the absence of peering, 
instead, two providers exchange traffic by using the services of upstream 
intermediaries;  we  will  hence  consider  this  as  the  “low  quality 
interconnection” case. Our database consists of the interconnection decisions 
characterizing the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) members of the London 
Internet Exchange Point (LINX). 
The results obtained seem to support the part of the theory claiming a 
positive relationship between providers’ asymmetry and quality. We also 
find that the bigger threat to interconnection fairness does not come from a 
market  share-based  dominance,  but  is  mostly  associated  to  the  relative 
centrality of the players in the Internet. This is an interesting result, since the 
actual Competition Authorities’ approach usually focuses on the assessment 
of Internet operators’ market shares.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
subject and discusses some technical aspects about Internet peering, while 
Section  3  focuses  on  the  game  theoretic  models  studying  interconnection 
agreements. Section 4 explains the process of data gathering and the criteria 
used  to  classify  the  Internet  Operators,  and  section  5  provides  the 
econometric analysis of the relevant model. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
7 The interest of Computer Scientists for interconnection agreements focuses on  the representation 
and analysis of the evolution of the Internet topology (Bar et al., 2005), and on  its efficiency from a 





2  The Internet hierarchy, peering and transit 
Internet  operators  may  be  classified  into  different  categories,  depending 
upon their position in the Internet hierarchy. At the top level there are the 
Tier-1 Transit Providers and the Internet Backbones (IBPs): they constitute the 
upstream  industry  (Kende,  2000)  providing  universal  connectivity  to  the 
downstream  industry,  constituted  by  operators  of  smaller  dimensions 
(Internet Service Providers8, or ISPs). At a further lower level in the Internet 
hierarchy there are the so-called Internet Access Providers, or IAPs, which 
usually obtain connectivity through a single connection to an ISP.  
The dominant feature of the Internet, the Network of networks, is the 
universal connectivity: users are able to access to each other, whatever the 
provider  they  subscribe  to.  This  is  only  possible  thanks  to  the  system  of 
bilateral interconnections between the Internet Operators: there are a variety 
of  commercial  agreements,  but  these  can  be  essentially  divided  into  two 
main categories: transit and peering.  
·  The  transit  agreement  leads  to  a  unilateral  provider-to-customer 
relationship:  the  Internet  Operator  “customer”  is  provided  with 
connectivity  to  the  entire  Internet  by  the  intermediary  Internet 
Operator  acting  as  an  “upstream  provider”;  for  this  service,  the 
customer pays a settlement fee to the provider. 
·  The  peering  agreement  leads  to  a  bilateral  direct  and  high  quality 
peer-to-peer relationship: each peer provides the other connectivity to 
its own network, usually without any settlement fee9. 
 
One of the main advantages from a peering agreement is the minimisation of 
traffic  costs:  Internet  Operators  do  not  have  to  pay  for  the  traffic  routed 
                                                 
8 This term has now fallen into a general looser usage, but it is properly used to describe regional 
providers that typically connect to multiple backbone providers (Woodcock, 2002). 
9 This is known as Sender Keeps All (SKA) peering, or Bill and Keep peering.  
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through  peering  networks.  While  peering  also  involves  the  sunk  cost  of 
interconnecting, borne by the two providers (see Norton, 2002), these costs 
fell sharply in the recent years, after the development and growth of the 
Internet  Exchange  Points10  (IXPs).  IXPs  are  organizations  that  provide  a 
centralised interconnection infrastructure   to the members ISPs, so that they 
can  exchange  bilateral  traffic  without  the  need  to  build  dedicated  extra 
circuits.  A second advantage enjoyed by peering providers, with respect to 
being connected through transit agreements with upstream providers, is the 
better  performance  of    the  traffic  flows  between  them:  this  is  due  to  the 
direct  nature  of  peering  and  it  is  technically  expressed  through  a  lower 
latency in the transmission of packets, and a greater reliability11. 
On the other hand, transit also has some advantages to peering. A well 
known one is that, contrarily to peering, transit agreements include Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs) that guarantees rapid repair if problems on the 
interconnection link occur, while if a  peering link experiences troubles, it is 
up to the peers to fix these.  This is one of the reasons for which mutual 
knowledge and reputation effects between peers seem crucial (this element 
is  strengthened  by  Titley,  1997)  to  decide  about  a  potential  peering 
relationship. 
Another advantage of transit over peering is its feature of “certainty”; since  
it  is  too  costly  to  have  a  reliable  measurement  of  the  traffic  volume 
bilaterally  exchanged,  it  is  difficult  to  establish    the  actual  advantages  in 
terms of traffic costs saving from peering. In this regard,  it is argued that the 
mutual  presence  at  several    different  IXPs,  for  a  pair  of  potential  peers, 
enhances the likelihood of peering. In this case, in fact, the peers are “on 
                                                 
10 Xu et al. (2004) find that the percentage of peering agreements between ISPs participating at IXPs is 
significantly higher than the percentage characterising the whole Internet, providing evidence that 
IXPs plays an important role in shaping the relationships betweens Internet operators. 
11 For a description of the relevant Internet  interconnection  quality parameters in an economic 





average” capable of routing the free traffic to the peering network relatively 
soon, without thus bearing much of the cost associated to carrying traffic 
packets.  This  incentive  to  deliver  the  traffic  packets  to  the  destination 
network  as  soon  as  possible  is  commonly  known  with  the  name  of  “hot 
potato routing”12 . 
Our  paper  empirically  investigates  the  relationship  between  providers 
asymmetry  and  interconnection  quality  degradation.  For  the  sake  of 
tractability,  we  consider  a  binary  case,  where  the  presence  of  a  peering 
contract represents the “high quality interconnection case”, while  otherwise 
operators exchange traffic through their upstream providers (“low quality 
interconnection case”).  
 
 
Figure 1: Two modalities of Interconnection 
 
 
The stylized figure above shows the two modalities a pair of providers 
can use to exchange traffic. The thick line represents a peering agreement, 
                                                 
12Hot potato routing is crucial in peering, and it involves technological aspects of traffic routing. 
Since carrying traffic is costly, when a packet has to be delivered from a network A to a network B, 
the network A  has the incentive to deliver the packet to B following the shortest path. If the networks 
are connected at many exchange points, each network is able to route relatively soon the traffic to the 




used to exchange their traffic directly; the dotted lines represent one or more 
transit agreements with upstream providers, in the Internet Cloud. 
The interconnection decision problem at hand has been addressed by 
several papers; many authors argued that peering is negatively affected by 
providers asymmetry13; in particular, two commonly argued reasons seem 
to induce a large provider to refuse peering with a small operator: they are 
the so-called backbone free riding and the business stealing effect. 
To understand the backbone free riding problem, we have to notice that, 
in any peering agreement, the smaller network gets the bigger benefit. Since 
the sunk and maintenance costs associated with the peering link are equally 
shared by the providers, the smaller network free rides on the bigger one. 
The business stealing refers to quality differentiation. Due to a network 
externality effect, a big provider is able to offer a better quality service to its 
customers  than  a  small  provider.  This  quality  differentiation  is  hence 
relevant  to  gain  more  customers.  If  two  networks  of  different  sizes  peer, 
however, this quality differentiation is dramatically reduced thanks to the 
new  peering  link  (we  can  think  about  the  new  link  as  joining  the  two 
providers into one big network); as a consequence, the larger network may 
lose customers to the advantage of the, usually cheaper, smaller network. 
For instance, let us consider the figure 1 above, and assume that the peering 
link is initially absent. If peering is realised, it might be possible that some 
customers of provider b decide to leave and join a, whose quality is now 
improved relatively to b.  
                                                 
13 See for example Norton (2002), Kende, (2000) and  Filstrup, (2001). According to Filstrup , who 
reports the selective peering criteria released by WorldCom, the symmetry in size is expressed in 






3  Game theoretic models of Internet peering 
One of the earliest theoretical works on the interconnection strategies 
between  competing  Internet  operators  is  due  to  Crémer,  Rey,  and  Tirole 
(2000).  They  study  the  interconnection  decision  between  two  backbones, 
with  one  having  a  larger  installed  base  of  consumers;  the  backbones 
compete à la Cournot over the remaining part of still unattached consumers.  
They consider a two stage game. In the first stage each backbone i chooses a 
quality  i q  for the interconnection; the effective quality of interconnection is 
then  { } 2 1, min q q .  Given  the  interconnection  quality,  the  backbones  choose 
their capacities and prices. The solution of the game relies on the comparison 
between two effects of degrading interconnection quality. If the connectivity 
between  the  two  networks  is  degraded,  both  backbones  face  a  demand 
reduction (their customers’ access to each others deteriorates). However, the 
degradation  of  the  connectivity  leads  to  a  greater  quality  differentiation 
between  the  two  networks,  which  increases  with  the  extent  of  network 
externality14.  The  larger  backbone  gains  competitive  advantage  over  the 
smaller  one.  Hence,  Crémer  et  al.  show  that  the  largest  network  has 
incentives to degrade interconnection with the smaller networks to further 
increase its market share (it attracts customers because it can offer a better 
quality service of the other15).  
On the same line are the results of Jahn and Prüfer (2004), and Weiss 
and Shin (2004). Jahn and Prüfer (2004) consider two Internet Operators that 
have a fixed base of customers, while they compete in prices over consumers 
                                                 
14  Indeed,  in  the  model  of  Crémer  et  al.,  the  quality  of  the  service  of  the  backbone  i  is  given  by 
( ) ( ) [ ] j j i i i q q v s + + + = b q b , where  i b  is the installed base of customers of the backbone i,  i q  is the 
number of unattached customers enrolled by backbone i,  [ ] 1 , 0 Î q  is the quality of interconnection, 
and v  a parameter that reflects the importance of connectivity. 
15 We referred before to this as the business stealing effect.  
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located  in  a  battlezone16.  They  show  that  sufficiently  symmetric  in  size 
(represented by the number of customers locked) networks reach a peering 
agreement; otherwise an upstream intermediary is used to exchange traffic. 
Weiss and Shin (2004) argue that the choice of the interconnection regime is 
based on the traffic volume, which, in turn, is linked to market share. Their 
model shows that symmetry in traffic positively affects peering17. 
Although the result that difference in size negatively affects peering is 
commonly accepted, there are some situations where it does not seem to 
work. First of all, peering does not necessarily imply business stealing if the 
networks  are  sufficiently  differentiated.  Secondly,  the  negative  effects  of 
business  stealing  and  free  riding  may  be  offset  by  other  positive  effects 
caused by network externalities. We now briefly point at these issues. 
Since  Internet  Operators  compete  for  downstream  customers  (either 
end  users  or  other  Internet  providers),  their  interconnection  strategy 
depends upon the preferences of these customers. Courcoubetis and Weber 
(2003) argue that “the decision as to whether or not peering is beneficial depends 
on  the  way  the  networks  are  differentiated  and  on  the  importance  that  their 
customers place on the differentiating parameters, such as size and location.” In this 
direction,  Foros  and  Hansen  (2001)  consider  horizontal  differentiation 
                                                 
16 The two networks are ex ante connected through an intermediary, defined as the cheapest Tier-1 
provider.  In  the  first  stage  of  the  game,  the  two  networks  decide  non  cooperatively  about  the 
interconnection regime: if they do not reach a peering regime (either bill and keep or paid), then they 
remain connected through the intermediary. In the subsequent stage the two networks set prices, 
competing  à  la  Hotelling  over  the  consumers  on  the  battlezone.  Finally,  consumers  choose  the 
network to subscribe with. Hence, while in Crémer et al. the strategic variable is the interconnection 
quality, here the strategic variable is the interconnection regime. 
17 In their model there is one IBP in the upstream market and two ISPs in the downstream market. The 
realisation  of  peering  between  the  two  ISPs  occurs  where  both  of  them  take  advantage  from  the 
reduction in the transit costs . Given the assumptions of the model, where traffic is associated with the 
market share, this occurs when the difference in the traffic volume of the two ISPs does not exceed a 
certain value k. Indeed, when the traffic generated differs significantly, the larger provider mainly 
routes its traffic within its network, and the fees paid to the upstream IBP are minimal. Hence, the 
large provider’s dominant strategy is not to peer, while the small provider would be better off in case 





between  two  Internet  Service  Providers  that  compete  á  la  Bertrand18, 
obtaining  the  opposite  result  as  Crémer  et  al.  (2000).  They  present  a  two 
stage  game:  in  the  first  stage,  the  two  Internet  Operators  choose  the 
interconnection quality, while in the second the two firms compete over end 
customers.  In  this  setting,  where  also  the  assumption  of  the  Operators 
having an installed customer base is removed, the network externality effect 
is  the  driving  force  that  leads  the  firms  to  increase  the  interconnection 
quality.  Mason  (1999)  studies  competition  between  ISPs  that  are  both 
horizontally and vertically differentiated, obtaining results in line with Foros 
and Hansen (2001). 
The network externality effect is also relevant in Baake and Wichmann 
(1999). In their model two Internet Operators competing a la  Cournot are 
interconnected through a backbone, and the interconnection quality can be 
improved by direct peering. Baake and Wichmann show that the peering 
decision may be profitable even if leads to a lower market share (because of 
the business stealing effect) for one of the networks; indeed, both networks 
may charge higher prices for the increased quality of the service offered after 
that peering is realised19. On the same line, Economides (2005) shows that, 
“with  the  same  assumptions  as  Crémer  et  al.  (2000)  except  now  allowing  for 
customer migration, the market equilibrium shows no (size) dominance by any firm 
and  no  network  has  incentive  to  degrade  interconnection”.  Indeed,  when 
customers  can  migrate,  the  interconnection  degradation  becomes 
unprofitable,  and  the  possibility  to  exploit  network  externalities  between 
                                                 
18 Preference for variety due to differentiation is driving the incentives for ISPs  of interconnection in 
Giovannetti (2002). 
19 The effect of an increase in the interconnection quality on Operator i’s profit can be divided into 
three main components: a direct effect, an indirect effect and the business stealing effect. The direct 
effect is positive given the assumptions in the model, and its value depends on both cost and network 
effects: an increase in the interconnection quality lowers the cost paid for transit, and also it increases 
the perceived network size for i’s customers, and hence the price they are willing to pay. The indirect 
effect,  which  also  depends  on  both  a  cost  and  a  price  component,  is  negative.  This  effect  is  
 
  15
operators leads to an increase in interconnection. This result is particularly 
relevant given the development of ISP multihoming20, since it allows greater 
customer migration between different upstream providers. Hence, while in 
Crémer et al. (2000) even a slightly larger network will refuse to interconnect 
with  other  networks,  in  Economides  (2005)  network  externalities  and 
demand for universal connectivity will force networks to interconnect. In 
this  setting,  other  strategies,  such  as  increase  in  the  prices  of  the  service 
offered,  are  more  profitable  than  degrading  interconnection.  The  role  of 
network externalities (modelled by the weight that consumers attribute to 
congestion and connection failure when choosing the provider) is present 
also  in  Badasyan  and  Chakrabarti  (2003).  They  study  the  incentives  of 
Internet  providers,  already  connected  through  a  National  Access  Point 
(NAP), to engage in private peering. Contrarily to the other models, in this 
work  the  peering  decisions  are  endogenous,  following  the  theory  of 
endogenous network formation21.  
 
4  Gathering the data and classification of Internet Operators 
4.1  Inferring the commercial agreements 
Obtaining data from Internet Operators is a particularly difficult task; almost 
everything  that  is  relevant  to  the  Economic  Research  is  labelled 
“confidential”: prices, traffic flows, commercial agreements, and so on. Our 
                                                                                                                                           
strengthened  by  the  business  stealing.  The  combination  of  the  effects  illustrated  above  makes  it 
possible that peering might still be profitable despite losing market share. 
20 An ISP is multihomed when it has two or more upstream providers (large backbones or regional 
backbones). The main reason to multihome is that is permits to maintain full connectivity even if one 
of the upstream providers has huge problems. The rationale behind ISP customers multihoming is 
exactly the same. 
21 Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003) consider both the Bala and Goyal (2000) fully non-cooperative 
approach,  where  Internet  Operators  signal  their  willingness  to  engage  in  peering,  and  peering  is 
realised  when  a  reciprocal  will  is  found,  and  the  Jackson  and  Wolinsky  (1996)  approach,  where 





interest lies in the study of commercial agreements. A source of information 
is available on the websites of some Internet Exchange Points; in particular, 
these websites provide a symmetric matrix (the peering matrix) with entries 
0 or 1, where 1 indicates the presence of interconnection (through peering or 
transit). The major drawback associated to these data is that it is not possible 
to analyse the strategic decisions between peering and transit. In the present 
work we overcome this problem, following recent developments in the field 
of  Theoretical  Computer  Sciences.  Indeed,  we  apply  recently  developed 
algorithms  in  order  to  infer  the  actual  bilateral  business  relationship 
between any given pair of Internet providers from publicly available data.  
The algorithms used to infer the business relationships can be grouped 
into two main categories, depending upon the source of data on which the 
inference is based upon: 
 
·  Inference from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
·  Inference from the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) 
 
The Border Gateway Protocol is a series of “instructions” that govern 
the  transmission  of  packets  over  the  Internet  through  connected 
independent networks. These instructions govern the micro-specification of 
the interconnection policies established between Internet Operators22. These 
policies, specified in the BGP data set, represent a “information treasure” for 
our research .  
Our second source of data is derived from Internet Routing Registries. 
These IRRs are large databases where Internet Service Providers willingly 
publish  their  routing policies23.  More  specifically,  the  data  we  used  were 
obtained mainly by using the algorithm devised by Huber et al. (2004), based 
                                                 
22 Technically known as Interdomain Routing. 
23 Routing policies mainly consists of two elements: route preferences and filtering policies; route 
preferences  indicate,  when  multiple  routes  to  the  same  destination  are  available,  which  one  is  
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on the Internet Routing Registry24; this information was complemented with 
inference based on the BGP tables25 (Gao, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2002; Di 
Battista et al., 2003) 26. 
 
4.2  Units of Analysis:  IBPs and ISPs 
Following  Filstrup  (2001)  and  Weiss  and  Shin  (2004),  we  differentiate 
between three classes of providers among Internet Operators, according to 
their “size”: Tier-1, Internet Backbones (IBPs) and Internet Service Providers 
                                                                                                                                           
preferred; filtering policies are instead used in order to hide some of the exported routes, or to filter 
some of the routes imported from Internet Operators. 
24 The fact that  the  information provided in  the IRR  by the Internet Operator is merely 
voluntary led to the beliefs that the IRR is poorly maintained, with obvious consequences 
on the actual reliability of the inferred relationships. However, Siganos and Faloutsos (2004) 
were able to derive a relatively large subset of data from IRR that were up to date and 
consistent with the observed BGP tables. . 
25 This approach starts by using  the BGP table paths to derive an undirected graph that connects 
providers, (Autonomous Systems, ASes). Then it infers  the existing  the commercial relationships 
from these paths. A central assumption for this inference  is that valid paths are valley free; in other 
words,  in  any  path  there  can  be  only  one  consecutive  chain  of  upstream  relationships  and  one 
consecutive of downstream relationships: the path starts with an AS, which is customer of the next 
upstream provider, and so on until the path reaches a peak, where it starts to descend. The economic 
logic of the valley free assumption is straightforward,  nobody would like to act as the valley AS, 
paying two upstream providers just to transfer traffic neither originated nor terminated at this node. 
The inference of the commercial relationships can be seen as a two step process. In the first stage, 
given the undirected graph obtained from the BGP tables, the following Type of Relationship problem is 
solved: “Given an undirected graph G, a set of paths,  and an integer k, find an orientation to all the 
edges of G such that the number of invalid paths is at most k”. In the second step, the directed graph 
obtained as the solution of the previous problem is refined to introduce peering relationships. The 
problem to be solved is the following: “Given an undirected graph G, a set of paths, and an integer k, 
find an orientation to some of the edges of G such that the number of invalid paths is at most k”. The first 
attempt in this direction is due to Gao (2001). The algorithm used by Gao bases the inference on the 
degree of each node (the degree of a node is defined as the number of edges that touch that node), 
considered  an  indicator  of  the  AS’s  size.  Subramanian  et al.  (2002)  analyse  the  BGP  tables-related 
graph from different vantage points, and base the inference on a probability measure attached to each 
edge orientation. Di Battista et al. (2003) introduce a new algorithm that reduces the number of invalid 
paths estimated with the approach of Subramanian et al. (2002). Dimitropoulos et al. (2005) provide 
some  arguments  against  the  approach  of  Subramanian  et  al.  (2002)  and  Di  Battista  et  al.  (2003), 
showing that other approaches that are not devoted to minimise the number of invalid paths produce 
more realistic results. An evaluation of the inference methods is provided by Xia and Gao (2004). They 
find that both the Gao approach and the Subramanian et al. approach are very effective in detecting 
transit relationships, while the accuracy for peering is significantly lower. 
26  The  drawbacks  characterising  the  BGP  approach  depends  instead  on  the  assumptions  made  to 
translate  paths  into  commercial  relationships.  Xia  and  Gao  (2004)  evaluated  several  BGP-based 
inference approaches, showing that about 98% of the relationships inferred as transit are correct, while 
about  70%  of  the  relationships  inferred  as  peering  are  correct.  Huber  et  al.  (2004)  find  that  the 





(ISPs) 27. We follow a two-step process: firstly we classify the providers into 
the above categories, and then we perform our econometric analysis on the 
inferred interconnection patterns among ISPs. 
The  population  of  Internet  Operators  considered  is  given  by  the 
members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX), one of the most 
important Internet Exchange Points in Europe according to both number of 
members and traffic routed. Although it is not possible to find a clear cut 
point to separate Internet Operators into the categories of IBPs and ISPs, it is 
indeed feasible   to approximately accomplish this task by looking at some 
“size”  metrics.  We  use  the  customer  cone,  introduced  by  the  Cooperative 
Association  for  Internet  Data  Analysis  (CAIDA).  Broadly  speaking,  the 
customer  cone  of  an  Internet  provider  is  given  by  the  number  of  the 
provider’s customers (i.e., the providers that buy transit services from the 
first), plus the providers’ customers’ customers, and so on28. This metrics, 
which is the  closest possible empirical estimate of “market share” is also 
used to rank the providers. We consider both the customer cone and the rank 
measure to separate the providers into IBPs and ISPs. 
 The original list of LINX members is given by 179 Internet Operators. 
49 providers were deleted. We firstly deleted the smallest Operators, with a 
very low customer cone29, classified as Internet Access Providers (IAPs); as 
                                                 
27 Today there are less than 10 Tier-1 providers and over 40 Internet backbones, and their number is 
increasing.  Tiers-1  are  characterised  by  the  fact  that  they  exchange  traffic  between  them  through 
peering, while they have generally only transit agreements with ISPs. There are more than 10,000 ISPs; 
they obtain universal connectivity through multiple interconnections with Tier-1 and or backbone 
providers (through transit or peering).  
28 CAIDA provides three alternative measures of the customer cone of a given Autonomous System 
(an Autonomous System, or AS, is a network that is administered by a single set of management rules 
that are controlled by one person, group or organization). The simplest measure of the customer cone  
of a certain AS is given by the number of its customers (other ASes), its customers’ customers, and so 
on. A more precise measure considers instead not the number of customers in the cone but the total 
number of prefixes that they advertise. Each prefix consists of several /24-address-space-segments, 
hence the most precise measure of customer cone of a certain AS considers the total number of /24-
network-segments contained in all its customers. We use the #/24-network-segments metric to rank 
the ISPs, since this is the metric that promises the least number of inaccuracies. 
29 Measuring between 0 and 16 units. Twelve providers were classified as IAPs.  
 
  19
seen in Section 2, IAPs are small providers below the category of ISPs in the 
Internet hierarchy. The other providers were deleted since we could only 
estimate a few interconnection agreements for them; where these operators 
constitute a relevant proportion of the LINX members, there not seems to be 
any selection issue involved with their exclusion. Among these providers, in 
fact, there are several non commercial Operators belonging to organizations 
such as APNIC (Asia Pacific Network Information Centre), ARIN (American 
Registry  for  Internet  Numbers)30  and  Réseaux  IP  Européens  (RIPE). 
Moreover, another issue to be considered is the presence in our sample of 
mirror providers and replica ASes31. Finally, the reasons for excluding other 
providers seem to be due essentially to their poor maintenance of the IRR 
database32.  
Among  the  remaining  130  providers,  we  individuated  5  Top  Tier-1 
Operators  (Level3,  Global  Crossing,  CWA,  UUNet,  NTT/Verio);  these 
providers  have  customer  cone  greater  than  4,000,000  units33.  The  group  of 
IBPs (18) is given by the providers with rank below 50; these providers are 
all  characterised  by  customer  cone  between  3,600,000  and  3,500,000  units. 
Finally, the  set of ISPs (98) consists of the providers having rank greater 
than 50 and customer cone lower by at least one order of magnitude with 
respect to the IBPs; this category is very heterogeneous, containing providers 
with customer cone between 380,000 and 16 units.  
The following figure 2 represents the inferred commercial agreements 
for the class of Internet Service Providers at LINX. The Internet Operators 
                                                 
30 APNIC and ARIN are present at LINX with the Operators AS2914, AS2828, AS4788, AS13768, 
AS22822.  
31 AS3741 is for instance a Mirror AS created by AS27822 to express its routing policy within the 
RIPE database. AS25310 is a “replica AS” for Cable and Wireless, already present in the LINX with 
the main AS3561. 
32 Again, it does not seem to exist a possible selection issue, since these latter providers have very 
different sizes and market power. 





are  sorted  according  to  their  increasing  rank34  in  the  Internet  hierarchy.  
Each square of the symmetric matrix shows the inferred agreement between 
the pair of providers indicated by the corresponding row and column. A 
dark dot indicates a peering relationship, while a white dot indicates that the 
two providers exchange traffic using their transit agreements with upstream 
providers. 
 
Figure 2: Inferred Interconnection Agreements 











5  ISPs interconnection model 
This section is devoted to the econometric analysis of the interconnection 
relationships among competing Internet Operators. As we argued before, we 
focussed on the class of Internet Service Providers that are members of the 
London Internet Exchange Point. 
 
5.1  Empirical specification 
The interconnection patterns between ISPs are expressed by a binary model, 
with the two possible outcomes given by peering and indirect interconnection; 
                                                 
34 Notice that a larger rank corresponds to a lower customer cone.  
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in the latter case, the providers will exchange traffic by using their upstream 
providers  as  intermediaries.  98  ISPs  were  considered,  giving  rise  to  4753 
pairs; among these, 2674 were inferred as connected through peering, while 
2079 were inferred as connected through upstream providers. 
The dependent variable is the peering decision, assuming value 1 when 
peering  between  the  pair  of  providers  occurs  and  0  otherwise.  The 
explanatory variables are devised to model the competitors’ asymmetry, the 
geographical  differentiation  (in  terms  of  both  headquarters  location  and 
IXPs coverage) and some technical elements, such as the hot potato routing. 
As we have seen before, hot potato routing refers to the fact that carrying 
traffic in the Internet is costly, and providers have the incentive to deliver 
traffic following the shortest way to the destination network35.  
The peculiar nature of the Internet asks for the utilisation of different 
metrics to assess the asymmetry between any pair of providers.  The first 
measure we considered is the difference in the providers’ customer cones. In 
particular, the customer cone is used as a proxy for market shares: for any pair 
of providers, the difference in their customer cones (diff_base) gives a market 
share-based measure of asymmetry.  
The  second  measure  introduced  involves  instead  a  market  power-
based  measure  of  asymmetry,  given  by  the  difference  in  the  providers’ 
betweenness (diff_centrality). This metrics is derived from BGP paths. Each one 
of these paths provides the  instructions  indicating the  sequence of different 
providers that a given traffic unit (called information packet) should follow, 
starting  from  the  originator  provider  to  reach  its  final    destination36. 
                                                 
35  While  assessing  their  incentives  towards  peering  providers  will  take  into  account  the 
possibility of delivering traffic to the peer’s network as soon as possible; this means that 
mutual presence at more exchange points is thought to positively affect  their incentives to 
do peering. 
36 Indeed, each path specifies with which other networks one provider should  interconnect to deliver 





Typically  there  are  multiple  paths  available  to  reach  the  same  off-net  
destination for traffic with the same origin.  In this case we focus on  the 
shortest path: given that carrying traffic is costly, the shortest paths are often 
preferred to others.  It is clearly an advantage, for a provider,  to appear in as 
many  shortest  paths    as  possible,  in  the  sense  it  becomes    an  almost 
unavoidable step for  Internet traffic going from and to other providers. We 
capture this notion of network centrality by using   a simple measure: the 
number of shortest paths an operator can be found in. We calculated this 
metrics, known  in the literature as betweenness centrality,37  for each Internet 
Operator v 38 : 
( ) ( ) ￿
Î ¹ ¹
=
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ s  
 
where   ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ s s =  is the number of shortest BGP paths from the Internet 
Operator  s  to  the  Operator  t  on  which  the  v  lies  on.  Hence,  betweenness 
expresses, from a network’s  topology aspect, the market power of  any given 
provider  by showing how unavoidable it   is, in the Internet traffic  flow 
paths, given the set of existing interconnection policies39. 
In order to take into account also possible size effects, we introduce in the 
estimation two further variables for each pair of providers: customer cone of 
                                                 
37 Introduced by Shimbel (1953). 
38    D’Ignazio  and  Giovannetti  (2006)  have  used  this  metric  to  assess  HHI  market  concentration 
indexes, we focus instead on the micro bilateral interconnection choices. 
39 The use of the difference in the betweenness measure could raise some endogeneity issues, in the 
sense that betweenness inevitably depends on the actual peering relationships pattern. A large number 
of peering agreements is normally reflected in high betweenness. In order to tackle this problem we 
introduced  another  regressor,  aimed  to  capture  this  “size  effect”,  given  by  the  “maximum 
betweenness”  for  each  pair  of  providers.  Once  we  control  for  this  effect,  the  difference  in  the 
betweenness between any pair of providers does not seem to depend much on their eventual peering 
relationship; indeed, if this were the case, then the peering link would increase both the providers’ 
betweenness in a similar measure, with very little effect on the difference.  
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the  largest  provider  (max_base),  and  betweenness  of  the  largest  provider 
(max_centrality)40. 
We also focus on the possible role that geographical differentiation can 
play  in  the  peering  decision.  It  is  often  argued  that  proximity  of  the 
operators  will  facilitate  mutual  knowledge  and  trust.  On  the  other  hand, 
peering  with  a  provider  located  further  away  will  provide  high  quality 
interconnection  with  a  differentiated  customer  base.  Geographical 
differentiation  can  exert  a  positive  impact  on  peering  if  two  providers, 
located further away, perceive themselves  more as complements than as 
substitutes. 
Geographical differentiation is captured by two independent variables. 
The  first, dist_hq, expresses the distance (in thousands of miles) between the 
headquarters  of  the  Internet  Operators.  The  distance  was  calculated 
following a two steps process: first, we located each Internet Operator by 
considering the latitude and longitude of its headquarter; then we estimated 
the distance between headquarters using the great circle distance rule41. The 
second  variable,  diff_ixp,  takes  into  account  the  different  geographical 
coverage:  for  any  pair  of  providers,  it  represents  the  difference  in  the 
number  of  memberships  among  the  most  important  Internet  Exchange 
Points all over the world42 that they have. 
                                                 
40 We are thankful to Daniel Ackerberg for precious suggestions on the econometric specification of 
our model. 
41 dist(Operator1- Operator 2) = RadiusEarth*ArcCos(Cos(Radians(90-Lat1))*Cos(Radians(90-Lat2)) 
+Sin(Radians(90-Lat1))*Sin(Radians(90-Lat2))* Cos(Radians(Long1-Long2))) 
42  We  considered  45  IXPs.  All  the  35  members  of  Euro-IX  were  included  (Aix  Athens,  Ams-ix 
Amsterdam,  Bcix  Berlin,  Bix  Budapest,  Bnix  Brussels,  Catnix  Barcelona,  Cixp  Geneva,  De-cix 
Frankfurt,  Espanix  Madrid,  Ficix  Helsinki,  Gigapix  Lisbon,  Gn-ix  Groningen,  In-ex  Dublin,  Lix 
Luxembourg,  Mix  Milan,  Msk-ix  Moscow,  Namex  Rome, Ndix  Enschede,  Netnod  Stockholm,  Nix 
Oslo,  Nix.cx  Prague,  Nota  Miami,  Parix  Paris,  Ronix  Bucharest,  Six  Ljubljana,  Tix  Zurich,  Topix 
Torino, Vix Vienna, Linx London, Lipex London, Lonap London, Manap Manchester, Xchangepoint 
London, Equinix 7 locations USA, Jpnap Tokyo). Other European IXPs were included (Free-ix Paris, 
Inxs  Munich,  Nl-ix  Amsterdam,  Swiss-ix  Zurich)  and  Extra-European  IXPs  (Ape  Auckland,  Hk-ix 





In order to model the technical elements behind the hot potato routing 
effect, discussed before, we constructed a variable, both_ixp, indicating, for 
each pair of providers, the number of IXPs at which they are both present43. 
This  variable  could  also  be  interpreted  as  expressing  a  reputation  effect, 
following  Titley  (1997).  Apart  from  the  difference  in  the  customer  cone 
measures, which was built using the March 2005 CAIDA database, all the 
remaining  data,  including  the  interconnection  agreements  inference,  were 
gathered in July 2005. 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the variables 
dependent variable   
peering (dummy) 
Assumes  value  1  in  case  of  peering  between  providers,  0 
otherwise. 
   
independent variables   
diff_base 
Difference in the customer cone  for any pair of providers in 
units of thousands 
max_base  Customer cone of the largest among the two providers 
dist_hq 
Distance (thousands of miles) between the headquarters of 
the two providers 
both_ixp  Number of IXPs in which both the providers are present. 
diff_ixp 
Difference  in  the  number  of  IXPs  in  which  both  the 
providers are present 
diff_centrality  Difference in the betweenness measure in thousands of units. 
max_centrality  Betweenness of the largest among the two providers 
 
                                                 
43 In order to generate this matrix of data we created a visual basic routine that cross-checked the 
memberships  for  each  pair  of  providers  among  the  most  important  IXPs  all  over  the  world.  See 
footnote 33 for the list of IXPs considered.  
 
  25
5.2  Estimation results 
We  estimated  a  logit  model  by  maximum  likelihood.  The  presence  of 
multiple  observations  for  each  ISP  in  our  dataset  is  likely  to  lead  to 
correlated residuals; we decided to tackle this problem by adding ISP fixed 
effects44. The results are reported below. 
 
 
Table 2: ISPs binary model results 
dependent variable: peering  Coeff.  Std. Err.  z  P>z 
independent variable         
         
diff_centrality  -.309  . 019  -15.80  0.000 
max_centrality  -.037  . 050  -0.73  0.464 
diff_ixp  .152  .030  5.13  0.000 
both_ixp  .809  .086  9.44  0.000 
dist_hq  . 060  . 027  2.20  0.028 
diff_base  -.013  .011  -1.13  0.260 
max_base  . 033  . 012  2.79  0.005 
Number of Observations    4753     
Pseudo R-Square    R2 = 0.3912     















Table 3: ISPs binary model, partial effects 
dependent Variable: P(y=1|x)    Std. Err.  z  P>z    x  
independent variable           
           
diff_centrality  -.0764  0.004810127  -15.80  0.000  3.39818 
max_centrality  -0.00907  0.012424658  -0.73  0.464  2.22423 
diff_ixp  .0375131        0.007312495  5.13  0.000  2.1843 
both_ixp  .1993277       0.021115222  9.44  0.000  1.46118 
dist_hq  .0148        0.006727273  2.20  0.028  2.16791 
diff_base  -0.00315  0.002787611  -1.13  0.260  20.0957 
max_base  0.00801  0.002870968  2.79  0.005  21.2218 
All the variables introduced are statistically significant, but the difference in 
the  customer  cone  and  the  maximum  value  for  the  betweenness.  The  two 
variables representing the competitors’ asymmetry seem to affect peering in 
the same way. Indeed, both the difference in the betweenness, which has also 
the  highest  z  statistic,  and  the  difference  in  the    customer  cone,  which  is 
however not statistically significant, are negatively related to peering. This 
result supports the claim that the quality of interconnection degrades as the 
asymmetry increases. 
A  possible  interpretation  relies  upon  the  fact  that  customer  cone 
expresses asymmetry in “size”, and the betweenness expresses asymmetry in 
“market power associated to unavoidability”. The asymmetry in size can be 
seen  as  a  “installed  base  of  customers”  element,  which  negatively  affects 
peering, like in Cremer et al. (2000) and Jahn and Pr￿fer (2004). On the other 
hand,  the  asymmetry  in  the  betweenness  expresses  difference  in  the 
bargaining  power  associated  to  the  traffic  routing;  moreover,  since  high 
betweenness presumably implies a large traffic, this measure of asymmetry 
may also indicate traffic imbalances between pairs of providers.  This result 
seems to support Weiss and Shin (2004); moreover, it also seems to show 
                                                                                                                                           
44 To do so, we introduce as many dummy variable as the number of ISPs. For each observation 
involving any two providers, the two relevant dummy variables are set equals to one.   
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that both the backbone free riding and the business stealing effects seem to play a 
decisive role against peering. 
Our  results  also  indicate  that  peering  seems  more  likely  when  the 
geographical  differentiation  increases:  both  the  distance  between 
headquarters,  as  well  as  the  geographic  IXP’s  coverage,  positively  affect 
peering. In this sense, we can see some support also for that part of research 
recognising  the  importance  of  differentiation  in  interconnection  decisions 
(Foros and Hansen, 2001, Economides, 2005). Finally, the mutual presence at 
several IXPs increases the chances of peering, following the logic of the hot 
potato  effect;  an  alternative  interpretation  of  this  result  lies  instead  on  the 
importance  of  knowledge  and  reputation  effects  on  peering  decisions 
(Titley,  1997).  The  estimated  partial  effects  (see  Appendix)  provide  some 
evidence about the magnitude of the covariates’ effects on peering.   
 
6  Conclusions 
In recent years, many game theoretic models have analysed the incentive 
structure  underlying  the  interconnection  agreements  between  Internet 
Operators. This research has also been playing an increasingly relevant role 
in informing recent Competition Authorities decisions in relevant Internet 
antitrust cases. The main issue at stake is  whether or not the asymmetry 
between  Internet  Operators  affects  the  quality  of  their  interconnection 
modalities, by providing incentives to interconnection quality degradation. 
While  theoretical  models  provide  contrasting  results,  there  is  a  lack  of 
empirical analysis on this issue. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap: we 
provided an   empirical analysis thanks to a novel approach to obtain data 
about  interconnection  regimes,  which  are  otherwise  usually  kept 
confidential  by  the  Internet  Operators.  In  particular,  we  exploited  some 





tools to infer aspects of the business’ nature of interconnection agreements 
from publicly available data. 
Our model focused on the interconnection patterns between competing 
Internet  Service  Providers  (ISPs)  at  the  London  Internet  Exchange  Point 
(LINX). We investigated if asymmetry is associated to quality degradation, 
expressed  by  the  systematic  absence  of  peering  between  providers  of 
different size. We introduced two distinct metrics to model the providers’ 
relevance, and therefore asymmetry:  the customer cone, providing a proxy 
for “market share”, and the betweenness, expressing the market centrality of 
any  given  player,  by  showing  its  degree  of  unavoidability  in  the  Internet 
traffic routing.  
The binary model introduced showed that both the customer cone based 
and the betweenness based measures of asymmetry have a negative   effect on 
the likelihood of establishing a peering relationship. Therefore, asymmetry 
seems to consistently provide incentives towards a quality degraded form of 
interconnection.  With  the  customer  cone  picking  up  the  installed  base  of 
customers, our results seems to show some support for Crèmer, Rey and 
Tirole, (2000) and Jahn and Pr￿fer (2004) although, in our data, there is little 
statistical  significance  for  this  effect.  Definitively  more  significant  is  the 
effect  associated  to  asymmetry  measured  in  terms  of  network  centrality, 
expressing relative market power as well as traffic imbalances. In this latter 
interpretation,  our  analysis  provides  empirical  support  to  the  theoretical 
results obtained by Weiss and Shin (2004). Hence, our results suggest that 
Competition Authorities should mostly be concerned about the “centrality 
of  a  player”,  rather  than  its  market  share,  to  avoid  quality  degradation 
strategies  adopted  by  bigger  providers  towards  smaller  ones.  So  far, 
however,  the  Competition  Authorities  based  their  antitrust  decisions  on 
market shares analysis.  
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On the other hand, the results obtained by Foros and Hansen (2001), 
and Economides (2005), pointing to the role played by differentiation and 
network externalities in driving the peering decision45 are captured in our 
analysis with  the estimated positive effects  on the likelihood of observing 
bilateral    peering  induced  by  geographical  distance  and  difference  in  the  
extent of markets covered. 
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Table A: ISPs binary models, variables summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
peering = 1  (2674 obs) 
diff_base  24.73925  64.24227  0  380.151 
max_base  26.50060  65.85295  0.032  380.167 
dist_hq  2.272856  2.40177  0  12.20257 
both_ixp  1.586761  0.888546  1  6 
diff_ixp  2.280853  1.726976  0  8 
diff_centrality  1.628163  2.388645  0  16.45 
max_centrality  1.875564  2.092597  0.024  16.067 
         
peering = 0  (2079 obs) 
diff_base  14.12309  39.74619  0  380.151 
max_base  14.43220  40.28598  0.016  380.167 
dist_hq  2.032935  2.286581  0  12.2011 
both_ixp  1.299663  0.60885  1  5 
diff_ixp  2.060125  1.638311  0  8 
diff_centrality  5.674763  6.65285  0  16.414 
max_centrality  2.762608  3.932070  0.024  16.067 
 
 
 